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Introduction
Germany’s campaign in Russia was intended to be the decisive factor in creating a
new German empire in central and eastern Europe, a living space that could be
restructured racially and economically in German interests as Hitler had defined them
in Mein Kampf. When he launched his armies against the Soviet Union in 1941 the
world had two good reasons to expect him to achieve a quick victory. One, for those
with long memories, was the Russian economic performance in 1914–17: when faced
with a small proportion of Germany’s military might, Russia had struggled to
mobilise itself and eventually disintegrated. The disintegration was just as much
economic as military and political; indeed, it could be argued that Russia’s economic
disintegration had been the primary factor in both Russia’s military defeat and the
Russian revolution. Another much fresher reason was that the Germans had just
proved in battlefields from Scandinavia to the Mediterranean that they were the best
soldiers in Europe.
In the outcome these expectations were overturned. The Soviet economy did not
disintegrate. The German army was overwhelmed by the scale and scope of Soviet
resistance. The Soviet Union turned out to be the killing ground of Nazi ambitions.
How did this come about? Production was decisive: the Allies outgunned the
Axis because they outproduced them. Economic factors carried more weight in the
Allied victory than military or political factors. For example, the Allies were not
better soldiers. It is true that some of the Allies were more democratic, but being a
democracy did not save the Czechs or the French and being a dictatorship did not
defeat the Soviets. The Allies won the war because their economies supported a
greater volume of war production and military personnel in larger numbers. This was
true of the war as a whole, and it was also true on the eastern front where the Soviet
economy, of a similar size to Germany’s but less developed and also seriously
weakened by invasion, supplied more soldiers and weapons.
In a recent essay on World War II, I asserted that “Ultimately, economics
determined the outcome”.1 A friendly critic objected that this left no room for “a
whole series of contingent factors — moral, political, technical, and organizational —
[that] worked to a greater or lesser degree on national war efforts”.2 I accept this
criticism in the following sense: determinism must make bad economics, for
economics is about nothing if not choices. To take it into account I will proceed as
follows. My paper begins by reviewing what is known about the outcomes of the
choices that people made. Part 1 surveys the scale of Soviet war preparations and
their possible motivations. Part 2 analyses the changing wartime availability and uses
of Soviet resources. Then I will consider the context within which these choices were
made and the outcomes were obtained, so part 3 offers a re–examination of the Soviet
economy in comparison with the German economy. In part 4 I propose a framework
for understanding the incentives that people faced in choosing to work with or against
the national war effort. Part 5 applies this analysis to the risks facing the Soviet
economy in 1942, and part 6 concludes.
                                                
1 Harrison (1998), 2. This view is directly descended from Goldsmith (1946).
2 Overy (1998).
21. War preparations
When war broke out the Soviet Union had already engaged in substantial
rearmament. In 1940, the last year of less than total war (the Soviet Union had used
military force only in Finland and the Baltic region), the Red Army comprised
between four and five million soldiers; the military budget consumed one third of
government outlays and 15 per cent of the net material product at prevailing prices.
One third of the military budget was allocated to procurement of weapons, and Soviet
industry produced thousands of tanks and combat aircraft, tens of thousands of guns
and mortars, and millions of infantry weapons.3
The strategic purposes of prewar rearmament have been much debated.
According to Lennart Samuelson’s archival study of chief of Red Army armament
Marshal M.N. Tukhachevskii, Soviet plans to build a military–industrial complex
were laid down before the so–called war scare of 1927.4 These plans were not aimed
at immediate armament to counter any particular military threat, since at the time
none existed. They involved huge investments in heavy and defence industry; an
economist might call them “forward–looking”. Samuelson does not rule on their
underlying motivation. Nikolai Simonov, on the other hand, has located these plans in
the context of the Stalinist regime’s basic insecurity: the Soviet leadership feared a
repetition of World War I when the industrial mobilization of a poorly integrated
agrarian economy in the face of an external threat resulted in economic collapse and
civil war. Simonov concludes that, although the 1927 war scare was just a scare, with
no real threat of immediate war, it was also a trigger for change. It reminded Soviet
leaders that the government of a poor country could be undermined by events at any
moment; external difficulties would immediately give rise to internal tensions
between the government and the peasantry which supplied both food and conscripts.
The possibility of such an outcome could only be eliminated by countering internal
and external threats simultaneously, in other words by executing the Stalin package of
industrialization and farm collectivization as preconditions for sustained
rearmament.5
Both Samuelson and Simonov confirm that in the mid–1930s Soviet military–
economic planning was reoriented away from abstract threats to real ones emanating
from Germany and Japan. As a result the pace of war production was accelerated far
beyond that envisaged earlier in the decade while contingency plans for a war of the
future became increasingly ambitious. In Samuelson’s view the military archives
leave open the question of whether these plans were designed to support an
aggressive war against Germany, rather than to counter a German attack. However,
the documentation assembled by Gabriel Gorodetsky in the central political,
diplomatic, and military archives has surely settled this issue: Stalin was trying to
head off Hitler’s colonial ambitions and had no plans to conquer Europe, although it
is true that his generals sometimes entertained the idea of a preemptive strike, and
attack as the best means of defence was the official military doctrine of the time.6
Finally, it should not be forgotten that the Soviet Union remained relatively poor.
The costs of prewar rearmament were much greater relative to Soviet resources and
incomes than equivalent efforts in Germany, Britain, or the United States. Moreover,
what was achieved by 1940 was only a tiny fraction of the effort required when war
broke out.
                                                
3 Harrison (1996), 68, 284; Davies and Harrison (1997), 372, 394.
4 Samuelson (1996, 2000a, and 2000b).
5 Simonov (1996a, 1996b, and 2000).
6 Gorodetsky (1999).
32. Wartime resources
The outlines of the Soviet wartime mobilisation of resources can be depicted in a few
tables and figures. Under the pressure of a deep invasion, Soviet GNP fell by one
third (table 1), while the resources allocated to defence increased not only relatively
but absolutely too. The pressure on resources was somewhat alleviated by foreign aid,
which was adding approximately 10 per cent in real terms to Soviet resources in 1943
and 1944. This is illustrated in figure 1, which compares Soviet production
possibilities and military versus civilian resource uses through the war years. The
bold line that wanders to the southeast before turning north marks the actual
combinations of military and civilian uses of resources, or total final demand, in each
year. The net import of Allied resources allowed the Soviet Union to use more
resources than its gross national product in 1942, 1943, and 1944. In each year the
Soviet Union’s real GNP is used to mark a budget line showing the alternative
possible uses of its own resources. The distance from the GNP line to the point
representing total final demand in each year shows the difference that Allied
resources made.
When the war was at its most intense, the resources available to the civilian
economy were reduced below the minimum required to replace stocks of physical and
Figure 1. Soviet production possibilities and uses of resources, 1940 to 1944 (billion
rubles at 1937 factor costs)
0
50
100
150
200
250
0 50 100 150 200 250
Real defence outlays, bn rubles
R
ea
l c
iv
ili
an
 o
u
tl
ay
s,
 b
n
 r
u
b
le
s
TFD
GNP
1940
1943
1942
'40
'41
'42
'43
'44
1944
1941
Source: see table 1. Total final demand (TFD) is the sum of civilian and defence outlays
and equals the gross national product (GNP) plus net imports.
4human capital. Household consumption was already being squeezed a little by
rearmament in 1940; it was squeezed ferociously in 1941–2 by the cut in overall
resources and the ballooning defence budget, and squeezed still further in 1943 by the
recovery of capital formation. At the low point living standards were roughly 40 per
cent below the prewar level. Millions were overworked and malnourished, and there
was substantial excess mortality amongst the civilian population.
The changes in the structure of Soviet production are illustrated in table 2. An
outstanding feature is the huge increase in value added in defence industry and
military services, against a backdrop of decline and collapse in other sectors. Just
between 1940 and 1942 the real output of most civilian branches fell by one half or
two thirds, while that of military services more than doubled, and that of defence
industry more than trebled. These trends are further illustrated in table 3; the latter
confirms that by 1942 there was an immense disproportion between the rise in war
production and the collapse of key materials such as steel, coal, and electricity, which
declined by just as much as the output of consumer goods.
The pattern of wartime employment is reconstructed in table 4. The structure of
employment changed much less than the structure of output; for example,
employment in defence industry grew by less than half between 1940 and 1944. To
some extent this gives a misleading impression. Millions of workers changed over
from producing for civilian needs to supplying the war effort without changing their
place of work or branch of industry. Although specialised defence industry was very
important, it was only the tip of an iceberg of war–related production. In addition to
weapons soldiers also needed food, fuel, transport services, and construction
materials. The defence industry itself relied on inputs from the machinery,
metallurgical, chemical, fuel, and energy sectors and transport services. All these had
further indirect requirements. When the indirect and direct requirements are
combined, the change in the composition of employment between 1940 and 1942 is
remarkable. Table 5 shows that between 1940 and 1942 the number of soldiers and
war workers supplying the war effort rose by nearly 14 millions. But since at the
same time the total size of the workforce fell by 32 millions, the result was to cut the
number of workers supplying the needs of the civilian economy by a staggering 46
millions. As a result, when more resources became available in 1943 and 1944 they
were probably used more to relieve the strain on the civilian economy than to increase
the war effort.
Two other aspects of employment change are represented poorly or not at all in
table 4. One is the role of forced labour. The table shows nearly two million labourers
employed in NKVD establishments at the outbreak of war. Labourers held by the
NKVD in camps, colonies, and labour settlements either worked in NKVD
establishments for construction or mineral extraction, or were leased to other
ministries. Those leased to other ministries are hidden in the official public sector
workforce total; they numbered roughly three quarters of a million in 1940–1, falling
to half a million in 1943–5. In general, therefore, the trend in the number of forced
labourers followed that of the workforce as a whole. On the other hand the gender
composition of the workforce changed profoundly: with men called up into military
service, women’s share in public sector employment rose from nearly two fifths
before the war to nearly three fifths in 1944. There was even more dramatic change in
the countryside, which was stripped of men and also of horses and machinery; by the
end of the war, four out of five collective farmers were women, who carried out basic
agricultural tasks predominantly by hand. 7
Wartime change in the structure of output therefore considerably affected the
structure of employment. Its other main reflection was in productivity. Present
estimates imply a very sharp divergence between productivity trends in defence and
                                                
7 Barber and Harrison (1991), 216.
5civilian industry. Table 6 suggests that between 1940 and 1944 value added per
defence industry worker trebled, while value added per worker in civilian sectors fell,
in some cases substantially. Essentially, much of the gain in defence industry output
which followed the German invasion was achieved through more efficient use of
existing materials, labour, and fixed capacity. A similar process was noted in
Germany and accounts for much of the belated surge of German war production
between 1941 and 1944.8 There was no efficiency gain in other sectors, and labour
productivity in the rest of the Soviet economy declined, increasing the resource
requirements of civilian output and making it more difficult to divert resources to
military use.
3. German comparisons
Comparisons with the German economy confirm how critical the situation was for the
Soviet Union in 1942. Table 7 shows that, although Soviet exceeded German GDP in
1940, the result of German wartime mobilisation and the deep invasion of Soviet
territory was to shift the balance strongly in Germany’s favour. In the most critical
years of the war overall Soviet resources were only 70 per cent of Germany’s, and the
increment arising from Allied aid compensated only to a small extent. It is true that
Germany was engaged on two fronts. Tables 8 and 9 show, however, that despite the
overall disadvantage the Soviet Union maintained a bigger army in the field than
Germany, and outproduced German industry systematically in weapons other than
warships.
Richard Overy and I agree that the technological key to Soviet superiority in the
output of weapons was mass production. 9 At the outbreak of war Soviet industry as a
whole was not larger and not more productive than German industry. The non–
industrial resources on which Soviet industry could draw were larger than Germany’s
in the sense of territory and population, but of considerably lower quality, more far–
flung, and less well integrated. Both countries had given considerable thought to
industrial mobilisation preparations, but the results were of questionable efficacy. In
both countries war production was poorly organised at first and productivity in the
military–industrial sector had been falling for several years. The most important
difference was that Soviet industry had made real strides towards mass production,
while German industry was still locked into an artisan mode of production that placed
a premium on quality and assortment rather than quantity. Soviet industry produced
fewer models of each type of weapon, and subjected them to less modification, but
produced them in far larger quantities. Thus the Soviet Union was able to make
considerably more effective use of its limited industrial resources than Germany.
The foundations of Soviet wartime mass production were laid in the prewar
period. However, the wartime period presents a sharp contrast in terms of the rate of
military product innovation which came to a virtual standstill. Before the war Soviet
defence industry was in a state of permanent technological reorganisation as new
models of aircraft, tanks, and other weapons were introduced and old ones phased out
at dizzying rate.10 In wartime Soviet industry introduced just three new aircraft, all in
1942, and two new tanks, one in 1942 and the other in 1943. Also in 1943 several
models of self–propelled artillery were also introduced, but these were scarcely
radical departures, being based on recombining existing guns and tank bodies. The
wartime budget for military research and development was strictly limited and no
significant wartime developments entered production before 1945; indeed one of the
charges against a number of senior air force and aviation industry leaders purged after
                                                
8 Overy (1994), 346; Abelshauser (1998), 155.
9 Overy (1995), 207; Harrison (2000).
10 Davies and Harrison (1997 and 2000).
6the war was that in wartime they had pursued mass production of existing weapons at
the expense of R&D, and so contributed to a postwar technological lag. In short,
while Germany brought in many new tanks and aircraft (including completely new
propulsion systems based on rockets and jets) the Red Army fought the war almost
exclusively on the basis of weapons designed beforehand. But the resulting huge
economies enabled the Soviet Union to make extremely effective use of its limited
industrial base.
For illustration consider tables 10 and 11; table 10 deals with the aircraft industry
and reproduces data already in the public domain, but recently released data for the
tank industry are now available and it is useful to compare them in table 11. These
tables show how Soviet industry concentrated on a small handful of models and
factories. Eight plants produced three quarters of all Soviet military aircraft during the
war, and half a dozen models accounted for three fifths of all the aircraft produced.
The picture in the tank industry was still more extreme. Six sites produced 90 per cent
of all tanks, and just two of them produced one half of the total. Five sites produced
the entire run of self–propelled artillery. The distinction betweeen a factory and a site
arises in table 11 because factories subject to wartime evacuation produced at more
than one site, which created an additional obstacle to mass production. This
distinction is not made in table 10. Four tank models accounted for 90 per cent of all
units produced, and one of them, the T–34, accounted for nearly three quarters. The
T–34 underwent just one major wartime modification: the gun was upgraded in 1944,
resulting in the T–34–85. Similarly just six models of self–propelled artillery were
introduced and one of them, the SU–76, accounted for more than half of all output.
4. The point of collapse
War production was a decisive element of the Soviet war effort. But in 1941 and 1942
its foundations were crumbling. Soviet factories could not operate without metals,
machinery, power, and transportation. Their workers needed to be fed and clothed,
and competed for the same means of subsistence as the soldiers on the front line and
the farmers in the rear. As war production climbed, this civilian infrastructure fell
away. While Soviet factories turned out columns of combat–ready vehicles and
aircraft, guns and shells, civilians were starving and freezing to death. The
tribulations of the other Allied economies, even Britain under submarine blockade
and aerial bombardment, seem almost frivolous in comparison. Why the Soviet
economy stopped short of outright collapse is therefore a proper and serious question.
How do such economies collapse? A country’s war effort will collapse when
citizens choose to invest effort elsewhere. In wartime the citizen may choose to
allocate effort to patriotic service of the country’s interest and to service of self–
interest. I define self–interest broadly: it includes service of anything to the exclusion
of the interest of the country. Between the country and the self are many layers of
association, for example the family, the village, or ethnic group. If the latter are
served in ways that conduce to the country’s interest I define it as patriotic service.
Otherwise self–interest is being served.
A patriotic citizen serves in whatever capacity the state directs, does his or her
duty, obeys orders, accepts rations, and respects state property; call this person a
mouse. Specifically, mice serve their country to prevent it from being defeated and in
the hope of victory. A self–serving citizen behaves opportunistically and ignores
orders or gets around regulations, goes absent without leave, jumps queues, and steals
government property and the property of others; call this person a rat. Specifically,
rats allocate effort between two kinds of theft. They steal nondurable goods, for
example food or civilian or military materials, in the hope of surviving until victory.
They also steal capital assets, for example durable goods, productive equipment, and
even land titles, in anticipation of defeat and in the hope of being permitted by the
enemy to establish postwar ownership rights.
7Citizens may choose to be rats or mice, their choice depending on the relative
payoffs. In other words mice are not better people than rats; it is not a moral choice,
just a choice between payoffs. This choice is forward–looking, being based on the
probability of defeat. Within the framework that I propose, the probability of defeat
depends exclusively on the balance of production available to the war effort on each
side. But the probability of defeat is endogenous since the level of production
available to the war effort depends on people’s choices.
Some possible implications are illustrated in figure 2 (for formal structure see the
appendix). Being a mouse brings a payoff. The expected return to patriotic behaviour
is the citizen’s share in the utility that results from defending one’s country (including
one’s community, one’s family, and oneself). This return, labelled m, will fall as the
number choosing to be mice falls. At the vertical axis there are only mice, and the
payoff to mice has the value m. To the right, the proportion of rats to mice increases
and with the community’s impoverishment the payoff to mice falls away. First, with
fewer mice less output is produced. Second, the growing population of rats diverts a
rising share of output away from the war effort. Both raise the probability of defeat
and cut the payoff to patriotism. Third, as the probability of defeat increases rats steal
a rising share of productive assets, which additionally cuts output. Eventually the
payoff to mice falls to zero at a point labelled n¢  where defeat is certain because
everyone has become a rat and output is zero.
Being a rat also brings returns. Consider panel (A). The return from stealing
output is labelled r. When everyone else is being patriotic the payoff to the first rat
will be substantial. The first to steal supplies will always be able to pick something of
a value higher than the payoff to patriotic activity: why else do governments find it
necessary to enforce wartime controls? So at the vertical axis r > m. But this return
will fall as the number choosing to be rats increases. First, there are fewer mice
producing less output for the rising population of rats to share. Second, as rats crowd
in the risk of confiscation rises at first. Wartime controls are enforced by threats:
crime incurs a certain probability of punishment, which confiscates the rat’s payoff
and reduces it to zero. Let the probability of punishment depend on the proportion of
rats to mice, so that it is low when rats are few and there is little threat for mice to
guard against; it rises as rats multiply, then peaks and falls again as mice become few
Payoff
m
r
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m
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Figure 2. The wartime payoffs to serving one’s country and serving oneself
(A) (B)
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8and are overwhelmed by rats.11 These considerations make the rats’ payoff decline
more rapidly at first than the returns to mice. As rats begins to outnumber mice the
rats’ risk of confiscation falls again, but the few remaining mice provide little output
for rats to steal, so the two payoffs converge on zero at n¢ , the point of certain defeat.
In addition to output rats also steal durable assets. The return from stealing assets
is labelled r ¢  in panel (A). Under home rule illegally held assets are always at risk of
confiscation. However, rats may calculate that under enemy rule, the previous legal
owner being unrepresented, possession of stolen assets will be nine points of the
law.12 As an extension, the enemy may encourage rats by offering to protect their
stolen assets after victory. Then the probability that property rights over grabbed
assets will become enforceable, and the incentive to grab, will rise with the
probability of defeat. And the probability of defeat will rise, the more output and
assets are grabbed. Of course while the country is undefeated rats still face the threat
of confiscation, and this rises at first when mice are still many, but eventually the
danger of confiscation will fade as rats multiply and defeat becomes more likely.
Combine the rats’ expected payoff under home rule with their payoff from the
enemy. In figure 2 these give panel (B). The rats’ combined payoff rr ¢+  is U–
shaped; it has one maximum when rats are few and pickings are rich, and another
when rats are so many that the country’s defeat is ensured. In between there is a zone
of disputed territory and unresolved conflict where the incentive to grab is weakened
by impoverishment and the risks of punishment: there is less to grab, and what is
grabbed cannot be held securely. But as defeat becomes more predictable the
incentive to grab what’s left rises again while the rats anticipate the enemy’s arrival.
A result is a stable equilibrium at e1. A few rats have invaded the community but,
with the return to self–serving activity dropping away, grabbing stops at the point
where the payoffs to rats and mice are equalised. Thus in any society at war a degree
of rule–breaking and self–serving activity might be normal without necessarily
threatening the state’s survival. Further to the right, there is an unstable equilibrium at
e2 which is the “point of collapse”. At the point of collapse the payoffs to rats and
mice are equal again. To the right of this point the higher reward goes to rats and the
war effort collapses unstoppably, taking the country straight to the other stable
equilibrium at e3 where the war is lost. But the existence of the “bad” equilibrium at
e3 is not a problem as long as the “good” equilibrium at e1 is self–sustaining.
The problem presented by the point of collapse can be translated into the terms of
a dictatorship of the stationary–bandit type.13 The dictator administers his assets
through agents. Each agent will remain loyal to the dictator’s interests as long as his
share in the dictator’s expected rents from the assets he administers exceeds the
expected value of the asset if it were stolen by the agent. If the agent were allowed to
gain by stealing from the dictator he would become a roving bandit. This would
reduce the expected value to all agents of serving the dictator loyally and increase the
others’ incentives to rove too. However, unregulated or roving banditry would also
reduce the value of assets to all agents, so a rational dictator will enforce cooperation
                                                
11 In this respect the position of rats is different from that usually attributed to
rent–seekers: up to a point at least, for rats there is no safety in numbers. On rent–
seeking see Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1993).
12 In English law possession implies ownership unless someone with a better
claim comes forward. Recently the appeal court ruled that someone who had bought a
car knowing it to be stolen was entitled to keep it since the previous owner was no
longer identifiable: there could be no one with a better claim. In short, “even a thief is
entitled to the protection of the criminal law against the theft from him of that which
he has stolen” (The Guardian, 23 March 2001).
13 Olson (1993).
9and rational agents will comply. However, their incentives would change if a
neighbouring bandit were to offer to settle on the territory, expropriate the dictator,
and share the rents on his new assets with the first few agents to defect, threatening
the rest with wholesale destruction.
5. The risk of collapse
When citizens chose between serving their country and serving themselves, their
calculations were driven by the probability of defeat. In the framework that I propose,
the probability of defeat depended exclusively on production. Thus, controlling for
rats, greater initial wealth always raised the payoff per mouse relative to the payoff
per rat and reduced the likelihood of a wartime collapse. A wealthier community
would offer a greater private return to its defence. A poorer enemy was less likely to
win and less likely in the event of victory to honour postwar claims to assets laid by
rats. When Japan attacked the United States, the rewards to American mice from
defending American prosperity were obviously substantial, and the Japanese ability to
offer significant rewards to American rats was self–evidently limited. The size
disparity of the US and Japanese GDPs ensured that the zone of stability for the US
war effort was very large: even if the good equilibrium allowed for significant
numbers of cheats and thieves, it remained far to the left of the point of collapse.14
There was not the slightest chance that the US war effort would collapse into a bad
equilibrium, even if a more faint–hearted or more isolationist administration might
have willfully chosen a less belligerent response to attack in the first place. This
suggests that initial resource disparities can be decisive
Think of two economies closer to each other in size, for example Germany and
the USSR, engaged in a military struggle that had become too close to call. Consider
the Soviet war effort in the winter of 1942. Huge Soviet wealth had already been
destroyed or lost to the invader. In figure 3 panel (A) illustrates this case. Controlling
for rats, the payoff per mouse had been depressed by capital losses. Controlling for
                                                
14 On food rationing violations in the United States in World War II see Mills and
Rockoff (1987).
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Figure 3. Two more cases
(A) Risk of collapse is high (B) Collapse is inevitable
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mice, the anarchy in the civilian economy and the dangers of outright defeat had
raised the payoff per rat. The net effect was to shift the good equilibrium dangerously
close to the point of collapse. Stalin could rationally fear that with only a small
additional capital loss the good equilibrium and the point of collapse would converge
and then disappear, making a disintegration of the Soviet war effort inevitable. This
case is illustrated in panel (B): there is only one equilibrium where collapse has
already occurred.
Under the circumstances shown in panel (A) of figure 3, the exact positions and
slopes of the various schedules became critically important, and the contingent
“moral, political, technical, and organizational” factors came fully into play. Fearing
destabilisation, and with few means available to raise the payoff to mice, the Soviet
regime did everything it could to depress the payoff to rats. It is true that the latter
was fixed in part by the expected policies of a victorious enemy, and Stalin was
helped by the fact that Hitler promised little or nothing to ethnic Russians. The Soviet
authorities also downshifted the expected payoff from German occupation by
threatening potential collaboration with death: even if the enemy prevailed,
collaborators would not live to receive any benefit.
Various experiences of 1941–2 testify both to the risks of destabilisation and the
measures taken to limit the expected payoff to self–serving activity, increasing
patriotic activity and strengthening the stable equilibrium.15
The probability of defeat
There were widespread initial expectations that Soviet resistance to German invasion
would follow the same course of unravelling and collapse as that already followed by
Poland, Netherlands, Belgium, France, Norway, Greece, and Yugoslavia. These were
accentuated by the ease with which the Wehrmacht moved into the Baltic and the
western Ukraine and the warmth of Germany’s reception there. The Soviet authorities
made determined efforts to manipulate perceptions of the probability of defeat. Stalin
suppressed information about Soviet defeats and casualties. Many were executed for
spreading defeatist rumours, which might simply have been the truth. Moscow and
Leningrad were closed to refugees from the occupied areas in the autumn of 1941 to
prevent the spread of information about Soviet defeats. The evacuation of civilians
from both Leningrad and Stalingrad was delayed by the authorities’ desire to conceal
the real military situation.
“Theft” of human capital
Against orders, millions of encircled Red Army soldiers surrendered to the invader in
the autumn and winter of 1941 and the spring of 1942. Some of those taken prisoner
went over to the German side and fought alongside the Wehrmacht, for example
General A.A. Vlasov’s “Russian Liberation Army”, and the Germans also recruited
national “legions” from ethnic groups in the occupied areas. At the end of July 1942
when the Germans’ summer offensive reached Rostov on Don, significant numbers of
Red Army troops ran away from the front line. In the economy, although labour
discipline became highly militarised, lateness, absenteeism, and illegal quitting
remained widespread.
Theft of durable goods and land titles
In the summer of 1941 defeatism stimulated speculative talk about sharing out state
grain stocks and collective livestock. In 1941–2 there were widespread reports of
collective farmers secretly agreeing the redivision of the kolkhoz fields into private
property in anticipation of the arrival of German troops. They did not know that
Hitler was determined to offer no concessions to Russian peasants, but the Germans
                                                
15 Unless otherwise specified all cases are taken from Barber and Harrison
(1991).
11
permitted some decollectivisation in the north Caucasus and this stimulated local
collaborationism. In mid–October 1941 at a critical moment in the battle for Moscow
there was panic in the streets of the capital and crowds looted public property. Some
of the trains evacuating the plant and equipment of the Soviet defence industries from
the southern and western regions to the remote interior in the autumn and winter of
1941 were looted as they moved eastward.
Theft of nondurable goods
Food crimes became widespread. People stole food from the state and stole from each
other. Military and civilian food administrators stole rations for own consumption and
for sideline trade. Civilians forged and traded ration cards. Food crimes reached the
extreme of cannibalism in Leningrad in the winter of 1941.16 In the winter of 1942
Red Army units in the Caucasus began helping themselves to local food supplies.17
Crimes and punishments
Stalin’s Order no. 270 of 16 August 1941 stigmatised the behaviour of soldiers who
allowed themselves to fall into captivity as “betrayal of the Motherland” and inflicted
both social and financial penalties on the families of Soviet prisoners of war. His
Order no. 227 of 28 July 1942 (“Not a step back”) combatted defeatism in the
retreating Red Army by deploying military police behind the lines to round up
stragglers and shoot men retreating without orders and officers who allowed their
units to disintegrate. While the war was still going on Stalin singled out several
national minorities suspected of collaboration, for example the Chechens, for mass
deportation to Siberia. After the war the Vlasovtsy were mercilessly pursued, and
Vlasov himself was horribly executed. Wartime “deserters” from the industrial front
were doggedly pursued and hundreds of thousands were sentenced to terms of
confinement in prisons and labour camps while the war continued.18 Finally, food
crimes were harshly punished, not infrequently by shooting.
The role of Lend–Lease
The first instalment of wartime Allied aid that reached the Soviet Union in 1942 was
small, amounting to some 5 per cent of Soviet GNP in that year (table 1). Although
Allied aid was used directly to supply the armed forces with both durable goods and
consumables, indirectly it probably released resources to households. By improving
the balance of overall resources it brought about a ceteris paribus improvement in the
payoff to patriotic citizens. In other words, Lend–Lease was stabilising. We cannot
measure the distance of the Soviet economy from the point of collapse in 1942, but it
can hardly be doubted that collapse was near. Without Lend–Lease it would have
been nearer.
6. Conclusion
The outcome of the war was decided by production, and production rested on the
mobilisation of overall resources into the war effort. But in 1942 the Soviet war effort
itself rested on a knife–edge. The war in that year saw a battle of motivations in
which a hundred million people made individual choices based on the information
and incentives available. Their preferences were shaped by moral, political, and
national feeling. But their context was determined by overall resources. Only where
the balance of overall resources was indecisive did moral, political, technical, and
organisational factors play a significant role.
                                                
16 In addition to Barber and Harrison (1991) see Moskoff (1990) and, on
Leningrad, Dzeniskevich (2001) and Barber (forthcoming).
17 Zolotarev (1998), 304–5.
18 Filtzer (2000).
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Tables
Table 1. Soviet GNP by final use, 1940 and 1942 to 1944 (billion rubles at 1937
factor cost and percent)
1940 1942 1943 1944
Gross national product 253.9 166.8 185.4 220.3
Net imports 0.0 7.8 19.0 22.9
Total final demand 253.9 174.5 204.4 243.2
Fixed capital formation 39.9 10.1 9.4 18.4
Inventories 10.2 –10.7 8.1 1.9
Defence 43.9 101.4 113.2 117.2
Government & security 10.1 5.4 6.0 7.9
Communal services 27.0 15.6 17.2 20.7
Household consumption 122.8 52.6 50.5 77.1
— per worker 100% 68% 63% 81%
— per head 100% .. 58% ..
Source: Harrison (1996), 104. Total final demand is the value of domestically produced and
imported goods and services available for household and government consumption and
investment, and equals GNP plus net imports.
Table 2. Soviet GNP by sector of origin, 1940 to 1945 (billion rubles at 1937 factor
cost)
1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945
Agriculture 69.9 44.1 27.4 30.5 45.1 47.3
Industry 75.1 73.3 64.8 75.7 84.9 71.9
— defence 10.5 16.8 38.7 47.8 52.3 36.7
— civilian 64.5 56.5 26.1 27.8 32.6 35.2
Construction 10.6 6.9 3.2 3.4 4.4 4.5
Transport &
communications 19.3 17.8 10.2 11.8 13.7 14.9
Trade & catering 11.1 9.3 3.8 3.5 4.1 5.0
Civilian services 46.4 42.3 28.2 30.6 37.7 35.3
Military services 7.9 11.1 17.4 18.2 18.7 18.6
— Army & Navy 6.8 9.9 16.2 17.0 17.5 17.3
— NKVD troops 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2
Net national product 240.3 204.7 155.1 173.6 208.6 197.4
Depreciation 13.6 14.0 11.7 11.8 11.7 11.7
Gross national product 253.9 218.7 166.8 185.4 220.3 209.1
Source: Harrison (1996), 92.
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Table 3. Soviet production, selected items, 1940 to 1944 (units)
1940 1941 1942 1943 1944
(A) Defence products
Combat aircraft 8 331 12 377 21 681 29 877 33 205
Armoured vehicles 2 794 6 590 24 719 24 006 28 983
Guns 15 343 40 547 128 092 130 295 122 385
Shells, million 43 83 133 175 184
Small arms, thou. 1 916 2 956 5 358 5 081 4 045
Cartridges, million 3 006 4 335 4 117 5 956 7 406
(B) Civilian products
Crude steel, thou. tons 18 317 17 893 8 070 8 475 10 887
Coal, thou. tons 165 923 151 428 75 536 93 141 121 470
Electric power, mn kWh 48 309 46 698 29 068 32 288 39 214
Cement, thou. tons 5 675 5 514 1 133 980 1 490
Cotton textiles, million m. 3 954 3 824 1 644 1 635 1 779
Grains, million tons 95.5 55.9 29.7 29.4 49.1
Source: Harrison (1996), 68–9.
Table 4. The Soviet working population, 1940 to 1945 (millions)
1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945
Working population 86.8 72.9 54.7 57.1 67.1 75.7
(A) By branch of employment
Agriculture 49.3 36.9 24.3 25.5 31.3 36.1
Industry 13.8 12.6 8.7 9.0 10.2 11.6
— defence 1.8 1.9 2.7 2.9 2.9 2.1
— civilian 12.0 10.7 5.9 6.1 7.3 9.5
Construction 2.4 2.3 1.5 1.5 1.9 2.2
Transport & communications 4.0 3.5 2.4 2.4 3.0 3.6
Trade & catering 3.3 2.8 1.7 1.7 2.1 2.5
Civilian services 9.1 7.7 4.8 5.1 6.5 7.7
Military services 5.0 7.1 11.3 11.9 12.2 12.1
(B) By type of establishment
Public sector 31.2 27.3 18.4 19.4 23.6 27.3
Artisan industry 2.1 1.8 0.9 1.0 1.2 1.5
Collective farms 47.0 34.9 22.7 23.8 28.9 33.5
NKVD establishments 1.6 1.8 1.4 1.1 1.1 1.3
Armed forces 5.0 7.1 11.3 11.9 12.2 12.1
Source: Harrison (1996), 98, 100.
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Table 5. The balance of direct–plus–indirect labour requirements of Soviet civilian
and military outlays, 1940 to 1944 (million)
1940–2 1942–4
Initial numbers
¾ Working population 86.8 54.7
¾ Soldiers 4.6 10.8
¾ War workers 9.8 17.3
¾ Civilian workers 72.5 26.5
Change over period
¾ Working population –32.1 +12.4
¾ Soldiers +6.2 +0.9
¾ War workers +7.5 –6.4
¾ Civilian workers –46.0 +17.9
Source: calculated from Harrison (1996), 100, 121. Civilian workers equal the working
population, less soldiers, less war workers. “Soldiers” do not include NKVD troops. The table
assumes that the effect of imports was to release domestic resources to the civilian economy.
Table 6. Net value added per worker in Soviet material production, 1940 to 1945
(rubles and 1937 factor cost)
1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945
Agriculture 1 417 1 194 1 129 1 193 1 441 1 311
Industry 5 458 5 820 7 484 8 428 8 361 6 215
— defence 6 019 8 939 14 108 16 616 18 135 17 788
— civilian 5 376 5 273 4 412 4 562 4 483 3 706
Construction 4 503 3 040 2 085 2 256 2 286 2 069
Transport &
communications 4 891 5 077 4 361 4 849 4 585 4 160
Trade & catering 3 336 3 286 2 248 2 065 1 976 2 026
Source: Harrison (1996), 103.
Table 7. Soviet and German GDPs, 1940 to 1945, in international dollars and 1990
prices (billions)
1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945
USSR 417 359 274 305 362 343
Germany 387 412 417 426 437 310
USSR/Germany 1.1 0.9 0.7 0.7 0.8 1.1
Source: Harrison (1998), 10. This table corrects a spreadsheet error in the source.
Table 8. Soviet and German armed forces, 1940 to 1945 (millions)
1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945
USSR 5.0 7.1 11.3 11.9 12.2 12.1
Germany 5.8 7.3 8.4 9.5 9.4 7.8
USSR/Germany 0.9 1.0 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.5
Source: Harrison (1998), 14.
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Table 9. Soviet and German war production, 1942 to 1944 (units)
USSR Germany USSR/Germany
Machine pistols (thou.) 5 501 695 7.9
Mortars (thou.) 306.5 66 4.6
Tanks (thou.) 77.5 35.2 2.2
Guns (thou.) 380 262 1.5
Rifles, carbines (thou.) 9 935 6 501 1.5
Machine guns (thou.) 1 254 889 1.4
Combat aircraft (thou.) 84.8 65 1.3
Major naval vessels 55 703 0.1
Source: Harrison (1998), 17.
Table 10. Production runs of Soviet aircraft, 1941 to 1945
10.1 Totals and averages
Models 23
Factories 34
Runs 70
Aircraft 142 756
— per model 6 207
— per factory 4 199
— per run 2 039
10.2 By factory
Factory no. Units Per cent
21 17 511 12
18 16 933 12
153 16 878 12
1 16 236 11
292 12 134 8
387 11 403 8
22 10 202 7
30 8 865 6
Subtotal 110 162 77
Other factories 32 594 23
Total 142 756 100
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Table 10 (continued).
10.3 By model
Model Factory Period Units Per cent
Il–2 18 1941–5 15 099 11
Il–2 1 1941–5 11 929 8
Il–2 30 1941–5 8 865 6
U–2 387 1942–5 11 403 8
Iak–9 153 1941–5 11 237 8
Pe–2 22 1942–4 10 058 7
La–5, La–5fn 21 1942–5 9 229 6
Iak–1 292 1941–4 8 534 6
Subtotal .. .. 86 354 60
Other aircraft .. .. 56 402 40
Total .. .. 142 756 100
Source: Harrison (2000), 114.
Table 11. Production runs of Soviet tanks and self–propelled artillery, 1941 to 1945
11.1 Totals and averages
Tanks SPA
Models 6 6
Factories 11 5
Sites 14 5
Runs 20 8
Units of output 78 859 23 587
— per model 13 143 3 931
— per factory 7 169 4 717
— per site 5 633 4 717
— per run 3 943 2 948
11.2 By site
Factory Site Tanks SPA
Units Per cent Units Per cent
183 N. Tagil 27 960 35 .. ..
112 Kr. Sormovo 11 999 15 .. ..
Kirov Cheliabinsk 11 970 15 5 306 22
GAZ Gor’kii 10 010 13 7 963 34
UZTM Sverdlovsk .. .. 5 630 24
174 Omsk 5 467 7 .. ..
STZ Stalingrad 3 776 5 .. ..
40 Mytishchi .. .. 2 462 10
38 Kirov .. .. 2 226 9
Subtotal 71 182 90 .. ..
Other sites 7 677 10 .. ..
Total 78 859 100 23 587 100
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Table 11 (continued).
11.3 By model: tanks
Model Factory Site Period Units Per cent
T–34, T–34–85 183 N. Tagil 1941–5 27 960 19
112 Kr. Sormovo 1941–5 11 999 15
174 Omsk 1942–5 8 644 11
Kirov Cheliabinsk 1942–4 5 094 6
STZ Stalingrad 1941–2 3 776 5
183 Khar’kov 1941 1 560 2
UZTM Sverdlovsk 1942–3 719 1
T–70 GAZ Gor’kii 1942–3 6 927 9
KV Kirov Cheliabinsk 1941–3 3 684 5
Kirov Leningrad 1941 844 1
IS–2 Kirov Cheliabinsk 1943–5 3 192 4
Kirov Leningrad 1945 60 0
Subtotal 71 282 90
Other models 7 577 10
Total 78 859 100
11.4 By model: self–propelled artillery
Model Factory Site Period Units Per cent
SU–76 GAZ Gor’kii 1943–5 7 963 34
40 Mytishchi 1943–5 2 462 10
38 Kirov 1942–4 2 226 9
ISU–122/152 Kirov Cheliabinsk 1943–5 4 635 20
SU–85 UZTM Sverdlovsk 1943–5 2 659 11
SU–100 UZTM Sverdlovsk 1944–5 2 335 10
SU–152 Kirov Cheliabinsk 1943–4 671 3
SU–122 UZTM Sverdlovsk 1942–3 636 3
Total 23 587 100
Source: calculated from Polikarpov (1998), 38–40.
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Appendix
In this appendix I provide a computable model of the payoffs to rats and mice,
underpinning figures 2 and 3 in the text.
Symbols
a production technology
a labour–elasticity of output
b labour–elasticity of theft
K capital assets
L working population
M mouse population
m payoff per mouse
n rats’ share in the working population
pC probability that the payoff will be confiscated by the government
pD probability that the country will be defeated by the enemy
pE probability that the enemy will honour claims to stolen goods
Q output
R rat population
r payoff per rat from theft of output
r¢ payoff per rat from theft of assets
T theft of output
t theft technology
T ¢ theft of assets
X output of the enemy
The payoff to mice
The payoff per mouse is the output not stolen, adjusted by the probability that it will
avert defeat, divided among the population of mice:
1. ( ) ÷
ø
ö
ç
è
æ -×-=
M
TQ
pm D1
The probability of defeat is defined exclusively by economics: the square of the
enemy’s share in the total of resources available being invested in the conflict. Think
of three possible outcomes: outright victory, outright defeat, and stalemate. Ex ante, a
country faced by an adversary of identical resources will have one chance in four of
victory, one in four of defeat, and one in two of an inconclusive outcome:
2. 
2
÷÷ø
ö
ççè
æ
--
=
TQX
X
p D
Output is produced by means of a conventional technology with constant returns
to scale and diminishing returns to each factor, the labour contributed by mice, and
the capital assets not stolen by rats and available for production:
3. ( ) aa -¢-××= 1TKMaQ
Rats use a theft technology with constant returns from what is to be stolen, and
diminishing returns to their labour:
4. bRQtT ××=  and bRKtT ××=¢
The number of rats and mice is constrained by the working population:
5. LnR ×=  and ( ) LnM ×-= 1
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The payoff to rats
The payoff per rat comprises two elements, the output they steal in order to survive
until victory weighted by the probability of not–defeat, and the assets they steal
against the likelihood of defeat weighted by the probabilities of defeat and that the
enemy will honour rights of possession, in each case adjusted for the probability of
avoiding confiscation by the government, and divided among the rats:
6. 
( ) ( )
R
Tpp
r DC
×-×-= 11  and 
( )
R
Tppp
r EDC
¢×××-=¢ 1
The probability of confiscation of stolen goods follows the geometric mean of the
shares of rats and mice in the population, low when the share of rats is low and there
is little threat for mice to guard against, rising with the level of self–serving activity,
then falling again as the share of mice falls and mice are overwhelmed by rats:
7. ( )nnpC -×= 1
Index K, L, and a to one. Set X equal to one (giving the adversary an economy of
identical capacity to the home country and a one–in–four ex ante probability of
outright victory), pE and t equal to one half, and a and b equal to two thirds. Subject
to these the payoffs can be computed and are charted in figure A–1.
Figure A–1. The payoffs to rats and mice
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